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Nearly twenty years ago, the New York Appellate Division,
Third Department, decided that the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy does not have a right to a trial by jury of the insurer's affirmative defense that the deceased insured had misrepresented
his medical history when he applied for the policy.1 Two years
ago, the New York Court of Appeals was presented with a similar
issue in the context of a commercial insurance policy and reached
the same result-misrepresentation by the insured was an issue
for the court to decide. 2
This writer is unable to agree with the result reached in these
cases and is convinced that they deprived insurance claimants of
their statutory and constitutional right to a jury trial. The difficulty attending disagreement with the two cases is compounded
because they adopted different reasons for reaching the same result. The two lines of reasoning are not inconsistent, merely different. Indeed, the court of appeals in Mercantile & GeneralReinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance Co. 3 cited the earlier case of
* 'Whitney Professor of Law, St. John's University. The author wishes to thank
his colleagues Vincent Alexander and Steven McSloy for their helpful comments on an
earlier drai of this article. This article expands on an essay published by the author
on the first page of the New York Law Journalon April 7, 1994.
1 Tober v. Schenectady Say. Bank, 389 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div. 1976).
2 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance Co., 624 N.E.2d 629
(N.Y. 1993).
3 Id.
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Tober v. Schenectady Savings Bank4 with apparent approval.
Thus, anyone who would undertake to disagree must address two
distinct rationales for denying a jury trial; if either ground withstands examination, the result is justified.
The starting point for analysis is section 4101 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"), which deals with the
right to a jury trial in civil cases. 5 In language derived from the
original Code of Procedure ("Field Code") of 1848, the statute sets
forth the types of actions in which trial by jury is available as a
matter of right.6 The enumeration is more explicit than the constitutional guarantee which historically provided that the right to
a jury trial was to be preserved inviolate in all cases in "which it
has been heretofore used."7 When this language was included in
the Constitution of 1846, which abolished the separate courts of
law and equity and merged their former powers into a single
supreme court, it effectively guaranteed jury trial in all actions
that would have been brought in the common-law court before the
merger and excluded from the guarantee all cases that previously
would have been bills in equity.'
4 See id. at 630 (citing Tober v. Schenectady Sav. Bank, 389 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App.
Div. 1976)).
5 See N.Y. Crv. PlAc. L. & R. 4101 (McKinney 1992) (hereinafter citations to the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules will use the abbreviation "CPLR" followed by
the relevant section number). A right to trial by jury on issues of fact is conferred in
the following types of actions:
1. an action in which a party demands and sets forth facts which would permit a judgment for a sum of money only;
2. an action of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for abatement of and damages
for a nuisance; to recover a chattel; or for determination of a claim to real
property under article fifteen of the real property actions and proceedings
law; and
3. any other action in which a party is entitled by the constitution or by
express provision of law to a trial by jury.
Id.

6

Id.

7 N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2. The same guarantee was contained in the first
constitution when New York passed from colony into statehood, see N.Y. CONST. of
1777, art. XLI, and was repeated again in 1821, see N.Y. CONST.of 1821, art. VII. The
guarantee was reiterated when the 1846 Constitution was superseded by the 1894
Constitution. See N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. I, § 2. The present constitution, adopted in
1938, limits the guarantee to "all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision." N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
8 See Moffat v. Mount, 17 Abb. Pr. 4,5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1863) ("The practice
of courts of equity in awarding issues ...does not confer on either party an absolute
right to a trial by jury.").
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The historic and current statutory classification of an action
"for a sum of money only" places an action by the beneficiary of an
insurance policy to recover the proceeds squarely within the jury
trial guarantee. 9 On this point there is no disagreement. CPLR
4101, however, distinguishes issues of fact raised by new matter
pleaded as an affirmative defense from issues of fact necessary to
establish the elements of the plaintiff's action. Even though the
action may command the right to trial by jury, the statute expressly states "that equitable defenses and equitable counterclaims shall be tried by the court."1 0 This is the nub of the controversy. When an insurance company defends an action for
payment of a policy with allegations that the insured made material misrepresentations to induce the insurer's consent to the contract, is the insurer raising an "equitable defense"? For separate
reasons, both the New York Appellate Division, Third Department, and the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the insurer is raising an equitable defense. This writer will present his
reasons why that conclusion was erroneous.
I.

STATUTORY HISTORY

CPLR 4101 appears to present an inconsistency of drafting
technique. In designating the types of actions entitled to jury
trial, the statute does not simply refer to "legal" actions, or actions
formerly brought in the common-law court; instead, it attempts to
enumerate the specific types of actions intended to be covered. 1 '
When the section deals with the trial of issues raised by an affirmative defense, however, it adopts the compendious method of referring to "equitable" defenses. This has been the structure of the
New York civil practice statute since the Field Code of 1848,
adopted as a result of the merger of law and equity in the Constitution of 1846.12 More precisely, the Field Code enumerated the
kinds of actions triable by jury,13 but neither mentioned nor dis9 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
10 CPLR 4101 (McKinney 1992).
11 See id.
12 See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 5-6 (providing for merger of law and equity into
one supreme court).
13 N.Y. CODE OF PROC. § 208 (1848) mandated jury trial of "an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property." In their note to this
section, submitted to the legislature, the code commissioners stated: "We propose an
extension of the right of trial by jury to many cases, not within the constitutional
provision." CO1MUSSIONMaS ON PRACTICE AND PiADINGs, FnIST REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 1848 OF THE STATE OF NEw YORI, at 851 (1848) [hereinafter FIRsT REPORT].
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tinguished actions at law from actions in equity or different types
of defenses. The Code simply stated that the defendant's answer
could contain "as many grounds of defence as he shall have." 14 In
addition, when determining the right to a jury trial, the Code
made no attempt to split the right to jury trial between issues
raised by the complaint and defensive issues raised by the answer.
The sole determinant of the right was the nature of the plaintiff's
action. If it fell within the statutory enumeration, the Field Code
required a jury trial for issues of fact. 15 An issue of fact was created "upon a material allegation in the complaint controverted by
the answer; or, upon new matter in the answer controverted by
the reply; or, upon new matter in the reply."16 It was apparently
assumed by the drafters of the Field Code that if any type of defense could be raised it would be tried in the same manner as all of
the other issues in the action. Such an assumption would be quite
consistent with the Code commissioners' stated purpose to "propose an extension of the right of trial by jury to many cases, not
within the constitutional guarantee."' 7
In 1851, the New York Court of Appeals decided that the
Field Code eliminated the old practice under the dual-court system whereby a defendant at law was required to bring a bill in
equity for an injunction against the common-law action if he
wished to raise some exclusively equitable ground to defeat the
law action. The Court held that under the new merged system an
equitable issue could now be raised directly by the answer to the
action.'" Equitable issues that were substantive defenses to legal
claims but were formerly affirmative suits in equity now became
defenses in form as well as substance. The "equitable defense"
was born.' 9 The following year, the legislature hastened to ratify
this holding. It renumbered and amended the original section
14 N.Y. CODE OF PROC. § 129 (1848) (renumbered in 1852 as

§ 150).

15 N.Y. CODE OF PROC. § 208 (1848) (renumbered in 1852 as § 253).
16 N.Y. CODE OF PROC. § 205 (1848) (renumbered in 1852 as § 250).
17 FIRST REPORT, supra note 13, at 185.
18 Haire v. Baker, 5 N.Y. 357, 362 (1851).

19 See Charles E. Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code, 11

CORNELL

L.

Q. 482,

491-93 (1926) (discussing history of equitable defenses); Walter W. Cook, Equitable

Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645, 645 (1923) (stating that New York Court of Appeals did
not share doubts as to whether Field Code related to equitable defenses); E. W.
Hinton, Equitable Defenses Under Modern Codes, 18 MICH. L. REv. 717, 723 (1920)
("[The Court of Appeals ... assumed that an equitable defense was available as a
matter of course because the code in terms had abolished the forms of action and the
distinction between actions at law and suits in equity.").
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dealing with the contents of the answer by including, for the first
time, an explicit reference to equity, stating: "The defendant may
set forth by answer, as many defences and counter-claims as he
may have, whether they be such as
have been heretofore denomi20
nated legal or equitable, or both."

This brief sketch of how the Field Code developed shows that
what appears to be dissonance in draftsmanship came about incrementally and without thought about the future consequences
to the right to trial by jury. The choice to enumerate the type of
actions triable as of right by jury, instead of simply tracking the
"heretofore used" language of the constitutional guarantee, was
seemingly made to expand the right. Further, the express reference to equitable defenses was added in 1852 to reaffirm a progressive decision on the contents of the answer, without affecting
the right to a jury trial of all issues of fact arising within the action. The legislature, however, created an ambiguity by introducing the counterclaim as a permissible part of the answer. 21 The
allegations contained in a counterclaim were probably not meant
to be included in the types of controverted allegations originally
designated by the statute as raising an "issue of fact" in the main
action and, thus, would not come within the right to jury trial that
attached to such issues of fact. If any legislator gave the matter
consideration, of which we have no evidence, it was probably
assumed that counterclaims would be treated as independent actions for jury trial purposes.2 This appears to have been assumed
by the courts thereafter,2 3 and was made explicit when the Field
20 N.Y. CODE OF PROC. § 150 (1852) (new matter emphasized).
21 This aspect of the 1852 amendment was undoubtedly in response to Haire v.
Baker, 5 N.Y. 357 (1851). In that case, while allowing defendant to plead an equitable
defense in the answer as a "defence admitted at law," id. at 362, the court held that
the Code did not permit a defendant to obtain affirmative relief against the plaintiff
and, consequently, sustained plaintiff's plenary equitable action, seeking reformation

of a deed. Id.
22 Prior to the 1852 amendment allowing counterclaims, one court observed:

It is settled, I believe, that an equitable defence may now be set up in
the answer in an action purely legal, ejectment, for instance; but it is clear

that in such an action the answer can not go beyond a defence and insert
facts with a view to affirmative relief, for the conclusive reason that the
mode of trial would be different. The defence must be tried by a jury; the
claim to relief by the court.
Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145, 153 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
23 See Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N.Y. 508, 509 (1874) (stating that where plaintiff
sought action of ejectment to recover possession of real property, issues as to legal

title were tried by jury but court reserved, for its own determination, issues presented
in defendant's answer seeking affirmative equitable relief); Gill v. Pelkey, 43 N.E.
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Code was superseded by the Code of Civil Procedure ("Throop
Code") in 1877.24

The decision in 1877 to place jury trial of counterclaims expressly on a separate footing from the mode of trying the original
action highlights, by contrast, the accepted understanding of how
defenses were to be tried.25 As part of the original action, they
were tried with all the other issues in the manner dictated by the
type of action. If an action was for a sum of money only, jury trial
attached to all issues of fact, including facts alleged in an equitable defense.26 If an action was historically equitable, defenses
raising purely legal issues were tried by the court. Neither the
991, 993 (Ohio 1896) (stating that when issue arises on defendant's request for affirmative equitable relief no jury trial by right exists).
24 See 1877 N.Y. Laws ch. 416. The Throop Code provided:
Where the defendant interposes a counterclaim, and demands an affirmative
judgment against the plaintiff, the mode of trial of an issue of fact arising
thereon is the same as if it arose in an action brought by the defendant,
against the plaintiff, for the cause of action stated in the counterclaim, and
demanding the same judgment.
Id.; N.Y. CODE OF CIVIL PROC. § 974 (1877), carried forward in CIv. PR¢c. ACr § 424
(1921). CPLR 4102(c) reconfirms the prior rule obliquely by providing that a
defendant,
shall not be deemed to have waived the right to trial by jury of the issues of
fact arising upon a claim, by joining it with... the issues of fact arising upon
a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, by asserting it in an action
in which there is no right to trial by jury.
CPLR 4102(c) (McKinney 1992); see DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 378, at
569 (2d ed. 1991) ("[A] defendant who interposes a counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, itselfjury triable, in an action in which the [plaintiff's] claim is not jury
triable, does not waive the jury on the [countericlaim, and that is so even though all of
the claims come from the same transaction.").
25 See CHARLES E. CLARK,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 105 n.77 (2d
ed. 1947). Judge Clark argued years later that § 974 of the Throop Code did not entail
the negative inference that equitable defenses were triable in the same manner as the
action. Id. Viewed in isolation, the statute is not logically conclusive on this point, but
is reinforced by other evidence of contemporary understanding. The early controversy
over whether equitable defenses should be allowed at all, which the court settled, see
Haire v. Baker, 5 N.Y. 357 (1851), and which the legislature promptly ratified, see
supra note 20 and accompanying text, arose because many judges believed that juries
were unsuited for trying traditionally equitable issues. See Hill v. McCarthy, 3 N.Y.
Code R. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); Crary v. Goodman, 9 Barb. 657, 663-64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Gen. Term 1851), rev'd, 12 N.Y. 266 (1855).
26 See CLARK,supra note 25, at 95-110 (discussing effects of Throop Code of Civil
Procedure).
27 See, e.g., Jamaica Sav. Bank v. M.S. Investing Co., 8 N.E.2d 493, 496 (N.Y.
1937) (stating that validity ofmortgage and amount of debt is triable by court in mortgage foreclosure action); Wurster v. Armfield, 90 N.Y.S. 699, 700-01 (App. Div. 1904)
(asserting that competency of defendant is triable by court in specific performance
action); King v. Ross, 51 N.Y.S. 138, 140 (App. Div. 1898) (holding that in equity-
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Throop Code nor the Civil Practice Act changed the Field Code in
this respect.28 It was not until the advent of the CPLR in 1963
that equitable defenses were separated out from the action and
made triable by the court.2 9
When the CPLR was enacted in 1963 it appears that very little thought was given to a serious constitutional problem. The
conventional interpretation of the 'heretofore used" clause in the
Constitution of 1894 is that it raised to constitutional status all
jury trial rights previously existing by force of statute alone.30
The 1938 Constitution, under which we currently operate, did not
create any new constitutional rights to jury trial, but carried forward all previously established constitutional rights. 3 1 Thus, if
the Field Code of 1848 and the Throop Code of 1877 made equitabased action to quiet title, absent request for affirmative relief in defendant's answer,
defendant is not entitled to jury trial).
28 The leading case on this point is Susquehana S.S. Co. v. A.O. Anderson & Co.,
146 N.E. 381 (N.Y. 1925) (interpreting §§ 422 and 425 of former Civil Practice Act).
The sections of the former Civil Practice Act applied in the Susquehana Steamship
case carried forward, without change, provisions found in the 1848 Field Code. 1848
N.Y. Laws ch. 379, § 208 (renumbered in 1852 to § 253); 1848 N.Y. Laws ch. 379,
§ 205 (renumbered in 1852 to § 250). Examples of pre-1894 cases recognizing the right
to jury trial of traditionally equitable defenses to legal actions include: Kirchner v.
New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 31 N.E. 1104 (N.Y. 1892) (involving action for forcible
eviction of plaintiff from his place of business); Southard v. Curley, 31 N.E. 330 (N.Y.
1892) (involving action for breach of contract to buy land); Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How.
Prac. 145, 153 (N.Y. Sup Ct. Spec. T. 1851) (dictum). Juries were used routinely without discussion for trial of equitable defenses in Pitcher v. Hennessey, 48 N.Y. 415
(1872); Chase v. Peck, 21 N.Y. 581 (1860); New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. Natl Protection
Ins. Co., 14 N.Y. 85 (1856); Crary v. Goodman, 12 N.Y. 266 (1855); Dobson v. Pearce,
12 N.Y. 156 (1854). Juries were used to try equitable replications to legal defenses in
Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 281 (1880); Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68
N.Y. 528 (1877); Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 283 (1876).
29 See CPLR 4101 (McKinney 1992).
30 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 550 N.E.2d 919, 921 (N.Y. 1990). The dictum in this case adopts the reasoning given by Surrogate Sobel in his exhaustive
opinion in In re Luria, 313 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sur. Ct. 1970).
The current view contradicts earlier dictum in Moot v. Moot, 108 N.E. 424, 426
(N.Y. 1915). It is also flatly inconsistent with the holdings of Maag v. Maag Gear Co.,
184 N.Y.S. 630 (App. Div. 1920), and Klein, Inc. v. New Deal Bldg. Corp., 14 N.Y.S.2d
323 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
31 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 2; see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YoRK CIVIL
4101.08 (1994).
PRACTICE
[Tihe right to jury trial today is constitutionally protected, first, in actions of
the type in which trial by jury was 'heretofore used" as a matter of right at
the time of the adoption of the first constitution in 1777 and, second, in those
actions in which a right to trial by jury was created by a statute enacted
between 1777 and the adoption of the 1894 constitution.
Id.; Lewis Mayers, The ConstitutionalGuaranteeof Jury Trial in New York, 7 BRooy.
L. REv. 180, 185 (1937) (discussing development of "heretofore" clause).
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ble defenses to "legal" actions triable by jury, that right presumably became constitutionally vested by virtue of the 1894 Constitution. This constitutional right was preserved in the 1938
Constitution and continues to this day. Where, then, did the legislature obtain the power to eliminate jury trial of equitable defenses in 1963 when it enacted the CPLR? The statement made in
the leading text that there is no constitutional problem because
there was no statutory right to jury trial of equitable defenses
33
prior to 189432 seems to be little more than wishful thinking.
The constitutional issue has never been addressed in any reported
case since the CPLR was enacted over thirty years ago, and the
mere passage of time may bury the issue under the weight of inertia.34 In any event, this is not the place to pursue the constitutional argument at length and, thus, the remainder of this article
will accept for the sake of argument the validity of CPLR 4101,
32 WEINSTEIN Er AL., supra note 31, 4101.38. The view that no constitutional
difficulty exists traces back to the advisory committee that recommended enactment
of the CPLR. In the ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT, 1958 Leg. Doc. No. 13, at 217, the committee states: 'The Proposal
[now CPLR 4101 (McKinney 1992)] raises no constitutional question because trial by
jury is not required for equitable issues." The breadth of this statement is belied by
the same report (at 565) where jury trial in partition, originally the creature of equity,
is said to have achieved constitutionally protected status under the 1894 constitution
by virtue of a statutory jury trial right created by the 1877 Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1544 (now N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 907 (McKinney 1979)).
33 This writer wishes to note his sympathy with the wish behind the thought. If
CPLR 4101 was properly interpreted, it would work far better than the pre-1963 rule
that threw all equitable defenses into the lap of the jury. Clearly, if a plaintiff sues for
reformation of a contract, his complaint states a cause of action in equity under the
historical test and neither party has a right to jury trial. If, however, the positions of
the parties are reversed and the party claiming reformation is sued as a defendant for
breach of the contract as written, the pre-CPLR rule allowed the defendant a jury
trial on his reformation defense because the plaintiff's action was "legal." See Bennett v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 58 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1900) (holding that where plaintiff sued on written contract, defense requesting reformation was triable by jury);
Southard v. Curley, 31 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1892) (judgment reversed for erroneous instruction to jury on equitable defense to contract action). The common-law jury is
poorly adapted to try the facts of a reformation claim, especially given the heightened
burden of proof involved and the operation of the parol evidence rule. Why should the
same issue be triable by jury when raised by a defendant in his answer, but not when
raised by a plaintiff in his complaint?
34 "Not lightly vacated is the verdict of quiescent years," said Chief Judge Cardozo in Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (N.Y. 1928), aff'd, 280 U.S. 218
(1930). The only hint of a constitutional problem with CPLR 4101 found by this writer
is a remark in a New York City Civil Court case stating that the section changed the
mode of trying equitable defenses "to the extent constitutionally permitted." Tishman
Realty & Constr. Co. v. Schmitt, 330 N.Y.S.2d 174, 181 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
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and will focus on what is meant by an "equitable defense" under
the statute.
II. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

For reasons partly historical and partly pragmatic, the dividing line between law and equity today - for jury trial purposes turns at times on the substantive grounds for relief and at times
on either the type of relief sought or the procedure involved. A
claim for the recovery of money obtained for breach of a fiduciary
duty exemplifies the former. Despite the literal language of the
statute, the historically equitable ground for relief dictates a
bench trial. 35 Further, a vendor's action for specific performance
of a land sale contract does not cease to be equitable because the
decree orders the purchaser to pay moneyA6 Similarly, a recent
37
scholarly opinion by Judge McLaughlin for the Second Circuit

reasoned that promissory estoppel as a substantive ground for enforcing a money promise was triable by jury as a legal claim, but
that promissory estoppel as a ground for avoiding the statute of
frauds was triable by the court as an equitable issue.3 8 On the
other hand, although a land purchaser's action for specific performance may present only conventional legal issues of contract
law, the character of the relief sought stamps the action as equitable.3 9 Likewise, conventional legal issues arising in the procedural context of interpleader are traditionally tried by the court
because of the historically equitable character of the procedure.4 °
35 See Clearview Gardens First Corp. v. Weisman, 134 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct.
1954) (stating that monetary relief for breach of fiduciary duty is equitable and triable
by court), affid, 139 N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. 1995); Valintine v. Richardt, 27 N.E. 255
(N.Y. 1891) (awarding personal money judgment in lieu of land restoration).
36 See, e.g., Walter v. Hoffman, 196 N.E. 291 (N.Y. 1935); Neponsit Holding Corp.
v. Ansorge, 214 N.Y.S. 91 (App. Div. 1926); Bensinger v. Erhardt, 77 N.Y.S. 577 (App.
Div. 1902).
37 Merex A.G., Inc. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821 (2d Cir. 1994).
38 See id. at 825.
39 See Rindge v. Baker, 57 N.Y. 209, 213-14 (1874) (stating that plaintiff is not
limited to action for specific performance where there is separate action for breach of
contract by way of performance), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 737 (1995); Bensinger v. Erhardt, 77 N.Y.S. 577 (App. Div. 1902); Danaher v. Hildebrand, 131 N.Y.S. 127, 128-29
(Sup. Ct. 1911) ("Where a title involves legal questions as to the construction or legal
effect of written instruments, they can and should be determined in an action for
specific performance."); CHARLEs A. WhiGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 2302, at 13 (1971).
40 Clark v. Mosher, 14 N.E. 96 (N.Y. 1887); Zeiss v. New York Life Ins. Co., 261
N.Y.S. 709 (App. Div. 1933). But see Geddes v. Rosen, 255 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Div.),
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Procedure

How does the dichotomy between substance and procedure relate to the issue under examination? In Tober v. Schenectady Savings Bank,41 the New York Appellate Division based its conclusion
on the type of relief sought, wholly apart from the grounds for
granting or withholding it. 42 When the beneficiary sued to recover
life insurance proceeds, the court held the insurer's defense of
misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy to be an equitable defense because the defendant was "really asking for rescission of the insurance contract."43 In one of the most extraordinary
nonsequiturs in legal literature, the court concluded that "an action for rescission of a life insurance policy is equitable in nature
...and is specifically excluded from trial by jury by CPLR 4101. "'
It is true that an action brought to obtain a decree rescinding
a contract is equitable according to the accepted historical test. 45

It is a type of relief unknown to the common law and which could
be obtained only from the chancellor. 46 In theory, however, an action to obtain a decree of rescission is not the same as rescission
per se. There are many pre-merger cases illustrating actions for
judgments at common law in which rescission of a contract was
the necessary predicate of the cause of action.47 For instance,
where a seller of goods was defrauded into consenting to a sale on
credit, he could unilaterally rescind and sue at law to replevin the
goods.48 In such a case, the rescission was not sought as a remedy
to be awarded by the court but rather the rescission was unilateraf'd, 210 N.E. 362 (N.Y. 1965) (finding that interpleaded defendants were entitled to
jury trial).
41 389 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div. 1976).
42 Id. at 39-40.
43

Id. at 39.

Id. (citations omitted).
See American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1937); Creamer v.
Helferstay, 448 A.2d 332, 335 (Md. 1982); Phoenix Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conway, 183
N.E.2d 754, 755 (N.Y. 1962).
46 See supra note 45.
47 See, e.g., Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570 (N.Y. 1835); Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio
69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Cary v. Hotailing, 1 Hill 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); Ash v.
Putnam, 1 Hill 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); Pierce & Pierce v. Drake, 15 Johns. 474 (N.Y.
Sup Ct. 1818); Willson v. Foree, 6 Johns. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
48 See Root, 13 Wend. at 571 (stating that fraudulent purchaser receives no title
from vendor); Masson, 1 Denio at 73 (holding that person fraudulently induced into
contract may avoid contract and claim return of any advance); Ash, 1 Hill at 305 (stating that no title passes when sale is procured by fraud).
44
45
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ally elected by the plaintiff in self-help. 4 9 The common-law court
simply recognized the efficacy of the plaintiff's prior rescission. 5°
Therefore, with the annulment of the special contract, the buyer's
possession of the goods became unlawful as against the plaintiff
and replevin was awarded. 5 ' Under the traditional rule, as a condition precedent to bringing the action, the plaintiff was required
to tender to the defendant a return of anything of value received
from him in the sale.5 2 This being done, the plaintiff established
53
an unconditional right to the goods at common law.
As with the relation between law and equity in other contexts,
the equitable action for a decree of rescission was not available
where the legal remedy based on rescission was adequate. 5 4 In
Schank v. Schuchman,5 5 the plaintiff had purchased goods and
services from the defendant by several contracts over a period of
time.5 6 The plaintiff, alleging the contracts had been fraudulently
induced by the defendant's bribing of the plaintiff's agent, sought
a decree rescinding the contracts and an award of the total
amount previously paid.5 7 The New York Court of Appeals held
that no equitable remedy was necessary because the plaintiff, a
victim of fraud, had a complete and adequate remedy at law predicated on a rescission of the sales contracts.5 8 The court further
49 See Masson, 1 Denio at 74 (stating that election to void contract resides with
plaintiff).
50 Id. at 73.

51 Cf Whitbeck v. Van Ness, 11 Johns. 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814). Without proof of
fraud in the inducement, neither replevin nor general assumpsit would have been
available; the seller would have been bound by the special contract. Id. at 411.
52 Kammerman v. Curtis, 33 N.E.2d 530 (N.Y. 1941); E.T.C. Corp. v. Title Guar.
& Trust Co., 2 N.E.2d 284 (N.Y. 1936). Unlike the common-law courts, whose judgments were required to be unconditional, courts of equity had discretion to render a
conditional decree; tender prior to suit was therefore not required because the final
decree could adjust the restitutio in integrum. Gould v. Cayuga County Nat'l Bank, 86
N.Y. 75 (1881); Allerton v. Allerton, 50 N.Y. 670 (1872). Whatever basis the traditional distinction ever had vanished with the merger and the rule for all types of
actions was belatedly conformed to the old equity rule by CPLR 3004 (originally enacted as 1946 N.Y. Laws ch. 683).
53 See supra note 52.
54 Buzard v. Houston, 119 U.S. 347 (1886).
55 106 N.E. 127 (N.Y. 1914).
56 Id. at 127.
57

Id.

58 Id. at 129; see Cable v. United States Life Ins. Co., 191 U.S. 288 (1903); Phoe-

nix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616 (1871); Home Ins. Co. v.
Stanchfield, 12 F. Cas. 449 (C.C.D. Minn. 1870) (No. 6660); Biermann v. Guaranty
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 N.W. 963 (Iowa 1909); Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. Omberson,
143 N.W. 735 (Minn. 1913); Globe Mut. Life Ins. v. Reals, 79 N.Y. 202 (1879). See
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opined that the legal remedy would be limited to the excess of the
price paid over the fair value.59
An action brought by an insurer to rescind an outstanding insurance policy and order that it be cancelled is subject to the same
test. Is the legal remedy adequate? The purpose of such an action
is ostensibly to provide the insurer immediate protection from the
beneficiary using the fraudulently induced policy against the insurer at law in the future. The allowance of this action amounts
to a preemptive strike by a potential law defendant against a potential law plaintiff. Courts have invariably recognized that in
the context of a beneficiary's action at law, the misrepresentation
issue would be tried by a jury, while in the context of the insurer's
action for a decree of rescission, the same issue would be tried by
the judge. ° Consequently, the test based on the adequacy of the
legal remedy is all that protects the beneficiary's right to choose a
forum in which a jury can be had as a matter of right. Numerous
cases have rejected the insurer's attempt to preempt the beneficiary's action at law by suing in equity for rescission, 61 often men62
tioning the right to trial by jury as a value worth preserving.
generally Buzard v. Houston, 119 U.S. 347 (1886); Fowler v. Palmer, 62 N.Y. 583
(1875); Geer v. Kissam, 3 Edw. Ch. 129 (N.Y. 1837); Gorman v. Low, 2 Edw. Ch.324
(N.Y. 1834).
59 Shank, 106 N.E. at 129. Writing for the court, Judge Cardozo stated:
The plaintiffs are simply seeking to get back a sum of money paid under a
contract, not affecting real estate, which they have elected to declare a nullity. To render that relief effective, it is not required that a court of equity
should anathematize the closed transactions. The cause of action is at law,
and the legal remedy is adequate.
Id. at 128; accord Walter v. Garland Auto. Co., 149 N.Y.S. 653 (App. Div. 1914); Dennin v. Powers, 160 N.Y.S. 636 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (Rodenbeck, J.). Judge Cardozo's reference to a possible exception for contracts affecting title to land was presumably based
on authority that land titles cannot be reclaimed by self-help and require execution of
a deed, which can only be compelled in equity. Bloomquist v. Farson, 118 N.E. 855
(N.Y. 1918); Allerton v. Allerton, 50 N.Y. 670 (1872); see WILItAm F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 493 (1930).
60 See, e.g., Cable v. United States Life Ins. Co., 191 U.S. 288 (1903); Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616 (1871).
61 See, e.g., id. at 620 ("Suits in equity... shall not be sustained.. . in any case
where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law.... ."); Bierman v.
Guaranty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 N.W. 963, 964 (Iowa 1909) ("Where a court of law
has already obtained jurisdiction of a controversy involving an alleged fraud, equity
will not interfere.").
62 Cable, 191 U.S. at 288 (finding that no remedy can be more complete than right
to defense at law which secures right to trial by jury); Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 623
(1871) (stating that trial by jury gives "nearly perfect and complete remedy"); Home
Ins. Co. v. Stanchfield, 12 F. Cas. 449 (C.C.D. Minn. 1870) (No. 6660); Biermann, 120
N.W. at 963 (explaining that if equity was allowed to interfere it would deprive plain-
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The only modern justification for allowing a preemptive equity action by the insurer against the beneficiary may be the existence of incontestability clauses in life insurance policies. One
traditional clause limited the insurer's right to avoid the policy
because of misrepresentation to two years after the policy was issued.6 3 Even where the insured died within two years, the time
limit on contest continued to run.6 4 A notice of cancellation sent to
the beneficiary would not stop the period from running; for the
purpose of the incontestability clause, contest meant joinder of issue in court.6 5 Thus, if the insured died within the two year period the beneficiary could wait until the period of contestibility
had expired before suing for the proceeds-any time within the
six year statute of limitations. Under these circumstances, the insurer's legal remedy could be lost and the preemptive action in
equity would be proper because it was necessary to preserve its
defense. 6 6
As with any equitable remedy, the courts exercised judicial
discretion in entertaining actions in equity for rescission. If the
insurer waited a reasonable interval after notifying the beneficiary that the claim was rejected, its action for rescission would
tiff of fumdamental right to jury trial); see Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. Omberson, 143
N.W. 735 (Minn. 1913); Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N.Y. 202 (1879). See
generally, Buzard v. Houston, 119 U.S. 347 (1886); Fowler v. Palmer, 62 N.Y. 583
(1875); Geer v. Kissam, 3 Edw. Ch. 129 (N.Y. 1837); Gorman v. Low, 2 Edw. Ch. 324
(N.Y. 1834).
63 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 177 (1923) (noting
that clause makes policy incontestable after two years from "date of issue").
64 Piasecki v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 154 N.E. 637, 637 (N.Y. 1926) ("[Ihe
policy should be incontestable on the simple condition that two years shall have
elapsed from the specified date, and not that it should be incontestable only if insured
should have lived until two years after the risk attached .... ").
65 Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 166 N.E. 798, 800 (N.Y. 1929). A "contest"
is described by the court as joinder of the disputed issues in court and a notice of
rejection is not included in this definition. Id. at 799. It is merely a notice that a
contest will ensue, but it is not a contest itself. Id.
66 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Watkin, 241 N.Y.S. 441 (App. Div. 1930), aff'd,
177 N.E. 164 (N.Y. 1931); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Markowitz, 16 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct.
1939); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Faillace, 244 N.Y.S. 426 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 246 N.Y.S.
893 (App. Div. 1930). Compare Markowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 203 N.Y.S.
534 (App. Term. 1924) with Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Snydecker, 215 N.Y.S. 276 (Sup. Ct.
1926). To reconcile these apparently different holdings, Judge Proskauer noted:
I have not overlooked the opinion in Markowitz v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co.
That opinion was written before the decision of the United States
....
Supreme Court in Mutual Life Ins. Co ... ofNew York v. Hurni Packing Co.,
... which holds squarely that the incontestability clause continues in effect
after the death of the assured for the benefit of the beneficiary.
Travelers'Ins.Co., 215 N.Y.S. at 277 (citations omitted).
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probably be viewed as being brought for the legitimate purpose of
protecting its rights from being lost through expiration of the period of contestability. On the other hand, if the period were not in
imminent danger of expiring, the rescission action might be rejected as an unjustified attempt to forestall the beneficiary's right
to a jury trial-particularly where the insurer was quick on the
draw and sued for rescission without so much as a prior notice of
67
cancellation in response to the beneficiary's proof of loss.
New York cases reveal considerable tactical jockeying for position. Contrary to precedent solidly established in other cases, 68
a few cases have held that the beneficiary's interposition of a counterclaim for the proceeds in the insurer's equitable action for rescission was a waiver of the right to jury trial and, thus, constituted consent to have the misrepresentation issue determined by
the court. 69 To circumvent these holdings, other beneficiaries who
were sued for rescission began a second independent action for the
proceeds. When the actions were consolidated and scheduled for
trial, judicial responses varied. One simple view was: first come,
first serve; since the insurer sued first, the beneficiary's action
would be stayed.7 ° Other cases, even where the insurer sued first,
balanced competing considerations such as the beneficiary's interest in obtaining a jury trial and the insurer's patience in the face

67 See Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 280 N.Y.S. 948 (App. Div. 1935); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kessler, 290 N.Y.S. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
68 DiMenna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 115 N.E. 993 (N.Y. 1917); Voges Mfg. Co. v.
New York & Queens Elec. Lt. & Power Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1941); Fot., v.
Wolfe, 245 N.Y.S. 505 (App. Div. 1930); Herb v. Metropolitan Hosp. & Dispensary, 80
N.Y.S. 552 (App. Div. 1903); Deeves v. Metropolitan Realty Co., 6 Misc. 91 (N.Y.C.
C.P. Gen. T. 1893), aff'd, 36 N.E. 739 (N.Y. 1894).
69 See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Marcin, 299 N.Y.S. 832 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(finding that beneficiary's legal counterclaim to insurer's equity action waived any
right to trial by jury); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Fillat, 215 N.Y.S. 277 (Sup.
Ct. 1926) (holding where counterclaim is to be tried, trial is only on those issues directly raised by reply). To find a waiver of a right to a jury trial by bringing a legal
counterclaim in an equitable action disregards DiMenna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 115
N.E. 993 (N.Y. 1917); Voges Mfg. Co. v. New York & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co.,
25 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1941); Fout v. Wolfe, 245 N.Y.S. 505 (App. Div. 1930);
Herb v. Metropolitan Hosp. & Dispensary, 80 N.Y.S. 552 (App. Div. 1903); and Deeves
v. Metropolitan Realty Co., 6 Misc. 91 (N.Y.C. C.P. Gen. Term 1893), aff'd, 36 N.E.
739 (N.Y. 1894).
70 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Marcin, 299 N.Y.S. 832 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Wolff v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 N.Y.S. 339, 340 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 271 N.Y.S. 1006 (App. Div.
1934) ("[Als the rescission action is the earlier one, it should be tried first, and the law
action will be stayed pending the disposition of the equity action.").
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of a dilatory beneficiary."' Two influential cases that sustained
the insurer's right to sue in equity emphasized the trial court's
72
power to exercise discretion in sequencing the trials.
The Tober case is unique in that in all of the earlier cases that
denied jury trial, the insurer had commenced an action for rescission first. In none of the cases decided before Tober had a New
York court allowed an insurer to trump the beneficiary's right to
jury trial by interposing a counterclaim for rescission where the
beneficiary had previously commenced an action at law for the
proceeds. In this situation the insurer's remedy at law was unquestionably adequate-the insurer could contest the beneficiary's claim by raising misrepresentation as a defense in the pending action. 3
71 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Haney, 296 N.Y.S. 576, 579 (Sup. Ct.
1937) (holding beneficiary's right to jury trial is "not absolute and may be lost by
dilatory tactics," staying action, and trying insurer's rescission action first); Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Kessler, 290 N.Y.S. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (awarding beneficiary jury
trial; noting insurer could not, without giving notice of intention to contest life insurance policy, deprive beneficiary of jury trial); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marzec, 262
N.Y.S. 558 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (staying insurer's rescission action until jury trial ofbeneficiary's action for proceeds).
72 See American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937). The Stewart case is
no longer authoritative because of modern federal cases holding that a legal issue
raised as a counterclaim to an action in equity must ordinarily be accorded a jury
trial. See Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 183 N.E.2d 754
(N.Y. 1962). In the Conway case, the New York Court ofAppeals noted that since the
insurer's rescission action was equitable, the insured's breach of contract counterclaim was not constitutionally triable by jury. Conway, 183 N.E.2d at 755. The statutory right to jury trial of a legal counterclaim, now found in CPLR 3019(d), 4102(c)
(McKinney 1992), was first created by the Code of Civil Procedure (the Throop Code)
in 1877. 1877 N.Y. Laws ch. 416, § 514. In MacKellar v. Rogers, 17 N.E. 350, 351
(N.Y. 1888), the New York Court of Appeals held that the right was statutory only,
not constitutional, because legal counterclaims had never been allowed in equity actions prior to the then operative constitution of 1846. Modern cases have reiterated
this holding. See, e.g., supra note 30. The court in Conway relied on these reiterations
in concluding that the insured's counterclaim fell outside the constitutional guarantee. Conway, 183 N.E.2d at 755. However, this position overlooks the "heretofore
used" clause in the New York Constitution of 1894 art. 1, § 2. The holding of Mackellar was correct when decided in 1888. But, the statutory right created in 1877 presumably became constitutionally vested in 1894 and is preserved in article 1, § 2 of

the current Constitution of 1938. See WEiNSTEIN,

ET AL.,

supra note 31,

4101.07;

supra note 24, § 377; see also Forrest v. Fuchs, 481 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (Sup.
Ct. 1984) (stating that "the right has been imbedded in New York's Constitution").
73 See Barrett v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 373 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 378 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 1978); Greenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 283
N.Y.S. 619 (App. Div. 1935); Schenck v. Prudential Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct.
1938). Aiter the Tober case, it appears that the Third Department treated a jury verdict as conclusive. See, e.g., Puccia v. Farmers & Traders Life Ins. Co., 428 N.Y.S.2d
SIEGEL,
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It should be noted that since the rationale for allowing the
insurer to seek a decree of rescission in equity was the danger of
losing its misrepresentation defense through lapse of time, the
1921 amendment74 to the New York statutory standard life insurance policy should put an end to most such actions. By the amendment, a life insurance policy may be written so as to become incontestable only if it is in effect for two years during the lifetime of
the insured.75 Thus, if the insured dies within two years after the
policy is issued, there is no further danger that the insurer may
76
lose a defense through the beneficiary's delay in bringing suit.
Consequently, the insurer "need not, and indeed could not bring
an equity action for rescission if the insured was then dead."77
This discussion has shown that "rescission" is an omnibus
term used variously to describe both a legal theory by which executed contracts are avoided and a specific procedural remedy in
court. When used as a theoretical predicate for an action by a defrauded seller to replevin goods or recover their value, the grounds
and procedure of the remedy are historically legal. When invoked
defensively by an insurer to avoid its contractual obligation, the
procedural context is neutral with respect to the distinction between law and equity.78 As with any defense to a legal claim
78 (App. Div. 1980). It is also worth noting that the insurer's right to contest cannot
be circumvented by the beneficiary's voluntary discontinuance of the action. Romano
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1936); Grana v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 260 N.Y.S. 576 (App. Div. 1932).
74 See 1921 N.Y. Laws ch. 407, § 1 (current version at N.Y. INs. LAw § 3203(a)(3)
(McKinney 1985)); G. Salzman, The Incontestable Clause in Life Insurance Policies,
1969 INs. L.J. 142, 144.
75 1921 N.Y. Laws ch. 407, § 1 (stating that provision shall be incontestable after
it has been in force for two years during life of insured).
76 Simon v. Government Employees Life Ins. Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. Div.
1980) (recognizing that under life insurance policy containing incontestancy clause,
insurer is entitled to contest policy after two years where insured died within that
period); Greenbaum v. Columbian Natl Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 616 (1934).
77 WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 592 (3d ed. 1951).
Currently, rescission actions based on misrepresentations that are discovered during
the lifetime of the insured continue to be appropriate. See Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y v. Kushman, 11 N.E.2d 719 (N.Y. 1937) (recognizing that equity may not cancel
insurance policy when insurer has adequate remedy at law) (citing Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Stone, 200 N.E. 679 (N.Y. 1936)); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pomerantz, 158 N.E. 21
(N.Y. 1927); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Rocanova, 556 N.Y.S.2d 624 (App. Div.
1990).
78 The concept of "rescission" would be completely superfluous were it not for the
insurer's obligation to return the premiums. Where the promise of both parties is
wholly executory, it should suffice to speak simply of the promisor's power of avoid-
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grounded in contract, it may be characterized as legal or equitable
according to the substantive ground invoked by the promisor. The
remainder of this article will demonstrate that fraud and material
misrepresentation are legal grounds, while mutual mistake is
probably an equitable ground.7 9
The one context in which "rescission" is necessarily equitable
for historically procedural reasons is where an action is brought
for the purpose of obtaining a decree to that effect. As explained by
Judge Cardozo in Schank, an action in equity for rescission lies
only when the petitioner's legal remedy is inadequate.8 0 In the
context of an insurance contract, the insurer's right to plead and
prove its misrepresentation defense in the beneficiary's action is
ordinarily an adequate remedy.
The Tober court both misconstrued and misapplied this law.
The adequate legal remedy of interposing a defense in the beneficiary's action for the proceeds was viewed as the equivalent of an
action for rescission. The many cases denying the equitable remance. Where the return of benefits is implicated, however, the cases uniformly speak
of rescission and restitution. Interestingly, in life insurance cases, the insurer's duty
to return the premiums runs not to the beneficiary whose claim is being litigated, but
rather, runs to the estate of the deceased owner of the policy. LaRocca v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 36 N.E.2d 126, 127-28 (N.Y. 1941). Nor does return of the
premiums appear to be a condition of the insurer's right to defend the beneficiary's
action; it is an independent issue between the insurer and the insured. Berger v.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing that insurer
need not tender premium prior to trial of fraud action) (citing Bavisotto v. United
States, 18 F. Supp. 355 (W.D.N.Y. 1937)); Perry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 153
N.Y.S. 459 (App. Div. 1915) (reversing judgment for insured on basis that defendant
has no obligation to tender return of premium paid by plaintiff before raising defense
that plaintiff made material misrepresentations); Dowd v. American Fire Ins. Co., 1
N.Y.S. 31 (App. Div. 1888) (holding failure of insurance company to return premiums
is not waiver of right to plead); see also Harris v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 3
Hun 724, 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1875) (holding that defendant insurer, who is sued by
party who fraudulently obtained obligation, will not be held to "any sharp rule of return, or offer to return," before suit is brought).
79 See Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J.);
Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Byan, 211 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1954) (Clark, J.); Harper v. City of
Newburgh, 145 N.Y.S. 59 (App. Div. 1913); Rill v. Darling, 253 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct.
1964). The Rill case is of special interest because it extends the equitable exclusion
from jury trial stated in CPLR 4101 to equitable replications as well as to the expressly mentioned equitable defenses and counterclaims. Id. at 185-86. This is a progressive interpretation that eluded some federal courts when they were first confronted with the federal Law and Equity Act of 1915 that first allowed equitable
defenses to actions brought at law. Id. Compare Keatley v. United States Trust Co.,
249 F. 296 (2d Cir. 1918) (noting necessity for strict interpretation of distinction between legal and equitable procedure) with Plews v. Burrage, 274 F. 881 (1st Cir. 1921)
(advocating same liberal interpretation as Rill gave New York statute).
80 Schank v. Shuchman, 106 N.E. 127, 128 (N.Y. 1914).
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edy because the legal remedy was adequate were turned topsyturvy by characterizing the legal remedy as another form of equitable remedy. The new maxim to be drawn from the Tober case is
that the legal remedy shall be denied when the equitable remedy
is adequate. Roscoe Pound once observed that reform in the law is
often produced because courts are ignorant of what was done in
the past."1 If denying a jury trial to plaintiffs in life insurance
cases is law reform, then Pound could wish for no better example
of his theory.
B.

Substance

When the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with the
jury trial issue in 1993, the action took a shape in which insurers
had occasionally circumvented the claimant's right to jury trial for
procedural reasons, discussed previously. In Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co. v. ColonialAssurance Co.,8 2 a company that
had issued business reinsurance brought an action to rescind the
policy on the ground of material misrepresentations by the insured.s 3 The defendant insured apparently failed to raise the issue as to whether the action for rescission was premature or
whether the insurer had an adequate remedy at law. The insured
simply counterclaimed for proceeds allegedly due and for consequential damages to its business arising from the insurer's refusal
to honor its contractual obligations. In this position, the trial
judge presumably could have exercised his discretion to try the
action for rescission first, postponing trial of the counterclaim for
breach of contract.8 4 Under New York precedents, a prior trial of
the rescission action could have been heard by the court alone as
an equity case.8 5 A finding of material misrepresentation would
86
have been res judicata, rendering the legal counterclaim moot,
81 RoscoE PouND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw 11 (1938). In reference

to the early judges in the newly settled western states, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Miller once said that they "did not know enough to do the wrong thing, so
they did the right thing." Id. at 11 (quoting Justice Miller).

82 624 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1993).
83 Id. at 629-30.
84 See CPLR 4011 (McKinney 1992); Forrest v. Fuchs, 481 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253
(Sup. Ct. 1984).
85 See supra note 47 (listing precedents demonstrating that prior trial of recission
action could have been heard first).
86 See Forrest,481 N.Y.S.2d at 254; see also Williamsburgh Sav. Bank v. Solon, 32
N.E. 1058 (N.Y. 1893) (ruling equity action finding that town's bonds are valid is conclusive in bondholder's later action at law on interest coupon). Compare Parklane
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and thereby accomplishing what Professor Siegel aptly criticizes
as "back door divestiture of the right to jury trial."8 7 Instead, the
court ordered both claims tried simultaneously before a jury,"8
which returned a verdict for the insured in excess of $14 million. 9
In response to interrogatories, the jury found that no material
misrepresentation or concealment had occurred and that the insurer was in breach.9 0 The trial judge chose to treat the verdict as
advisory with respect to the rescission action and found, contrary
to the jury, that there had been material misrepresentations,
thereby granting a judgment rescinding the policy. 9 1 This, of
course, nullified the damage award. The Appellate Division, First
Department, reversed the trial court and reinstated the jury's verdict.9 2 It held that where there is a right to jury trial on a legal
cause of action by one party, that verdict must be given conclusive
effect on a common issue, such as misrepresentation, which is critical to the other party's equitable counterclaim. 93 On further appeal, the court of appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the trial court's judgment rescinding the insurance
contract.9 4
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that equity action finding has collateral estoppel effect in subsequent legal action) with Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.,
494 U.S. 545 (1990) (denying collateral estoppel where legal action had been erroneously dismissed and equitable action was thereby improperly given temporal
priority).
87 SIEGEL, supra note 24, § 378. Utilizing a bifurcated trial will not be dispositive
of the jury trial issue in all cases. For example, if the insured brings the initial action
for breach of contract and the insurer defends or counterclaims on the ground of material misrepresentation, an advance trial addressing the misrepresentation issue
should be conducted before a jury. In this scenario, equity traditionally did not intervene because the defendant's legal remedy was adequate. See Bowie v. Sorrell, 209
F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953) (recognizing that granting of separate trials of separate issues
is within sound discretion of trial judge); Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 589 F. Supp. 296
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that where jury has made preliminary determination of invalidity of releases before tort liability was tried, court had power to require return of
consideration before such trial).
88 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Spanno Corp., 573 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup.
Ct. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance
Co., 591 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd, 624 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1993).
89 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance Co., 591 N.Y.S.2d
1015, 1016-17 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd, 624 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1993).
90 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Spanno Corp., 573 N.Y.S.2d at 104-05.
91 Id. at 105.
92 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance Co., 591 N.Y.S.2d at
1017.
93 Id. at 1017-18.
94 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance Co., 624 N.E.2d 629
(N.Y. 1993).
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The New York Court of Appeals passed by the opportunity to
reexamine the power of the trial court to effectively circumvent a
party's right to jury trial by sequencing a prior trial of an equitable counterclaim, or the appropriate priority to be given the jury's
verdict when legal and equitable counterclaims are tried simultaneously. The court simply acquiesced without comment in the Appellate Division's major premise that a jury verdict on an issue
common to simultaneously tried legal and equitable claims
trumps the trial judge's power to treat the verdict as advisory on
the equitable claim. The court of appeals, however, parted company with the Appellate Division with respect to its minor premise that the issue of material misrepresentation was truly common
to both the insured's claim for contract damages at law and the
insurer's claim for rescission in equity. 95 According to the court of
appeals, the jury's verdict on the breach of contract claim only entailed a finding that the contract was "facially valid,"9 6 not
whether it might be subject to avoidance for misrepresentation.
Indeed, the court stated that the jury's verdict and the judge's
finding were perfectly compatible; rescission presupposes an
otherwise valid contract-otherwise there would be nothing to rescind and the concept would be superfluous.9 7 Thus, the validity
of the contract as a legal question for the jury was held to be distinct from its voidability for misrepresentation, an equitable question for the court under CPLR 4101." s
The distinction drawn by the New York Court of Appeals appears to be between proof that would render a contract void and
proof that would render a contract voidable. This, in turn, involves the ancient distinction between the effect of fraud in the
factum at law and fraud in the inducement in equity. Where a
contract right or property ownership depended on a party's consent, the party who had allegedly consented could avoid the effect
of his manifested assent at common law by pleading non est facSee id. at 629-30.
See id. at 630. The court observed that the judge's "finding of material misrepresentation is not inconsistent with a [jury] finding that the parties entered into a
contract ... [but] [t]o the contrary, the very essence of a rescission action is to set
aside a contract that is otherwise valid and binding." Id. at 630.
95
96

97

Id.

98 Although the insured's breach of contract claim was made as a counterclaim to
the insurer's rescission action, the Court of Appeals analyzed the misrepresentation
issue as arising as an equitable defense and counterclaim to the insured's damage
claim.
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turn, i.e., it was not his act. 9 This plea could be sustained only by
proof that the party was misled into misunderstanding the essential nature of what he was doing. For example, in 1582, an illiterate man named Thoroughgood executed a deed in fee simple of his
land to one William Chicken upon the assurance of a third party
who asserted, "Goodman Thoroughgood, the effect of it is this, that
you do release to William Chicken all the arrearages of rent that
he doth owe you and no otherwise." 10 0 Since Thoroughgood had
been deceived as to the nature of the document, the deed was held
void at law as against a successor of Chicken. 10 1 If, however, the
party knew what he was signing, his plea of non est factum would
fail, even if he had been defrauded about the consideration he was
receiving in exchange. Thus, if a person signed a promissory note
or bond in payment for a jewel, he remained bound at common law
even if the seller knew that the jewel was a fake. 10 2
Since the common-law judges refused to extend the plea of
non est factum to the type of fraud called fraud in the inducement,
or consideration, it fell to the Chancellor to afford a remedy to the
fraud victim. If one's consent to a legally valid obligation had been
induced by fraud (or, later, innocent misrepresentation), the
Chancellor would enjoin the fraud-feasor from enforcing his legal
right in the common-law court.10 3 The common-law judges did not
at first take the Chancellor's interference lying down. They saw
99 See BLAcIes LAw DICTIONARY 1053 (6th ed. 1990) (defining non est factum as "a
plea denying execution of [an] instrument sued on").
100 Thoroughgood v. Cole, 76 Eng. Rep. 408, 409 (C.P. 1582).
101 Id. at 410. This old case has been relied upon to show that, in contrast to
equity, a document void at law confers no rights on anyone, even an innocent thirdparty purchaser for value. See Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 170 N.E. 530, 532 (N.Y.
1930) ("In relying upon the word of one who had been his trusted lawyer, surely the
plaintiff was less careless than was Thoroughgood in relying on the word of a stranger."); c.f. Marden v. Dorthy, 54 N.E. 726, 728 (N.Y. 1899).
102 Courtney v. Glanvil, 79 Eng. Rep. 294 (K.B. 1615) (enforcing sale of fake jewel
even though seller fraudulently represented it as real).
103 See WALSH, supranote 59, at 492-93; James B. Ames, Specialty Contractsand
EquitableDefences, 9 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1895). The distinction between fraud in the
factum at law and fraud in the inducement in equity is summarized in 5 SAMEL
WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOiMSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1488, at
4154-55 (Rev. ed. 1937):
Fraud may induce a person to assent to do something which he would
not otherwise have done, or it may induce him to believe that the act which
he does is something other than it actually is. In the first case the act of the
defrauded person is operative though voidable; in the second case the act of
the defrauded person is void, because he does not know he is doing and does
not intend to do this act.
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their independence threatened by an official closely identified with
Royal prerogative; and in 1616, Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of
the King's Bench, attempted to indict those responsible for seeking Lord Chancellor Ellsemere's injunction in the case of the jewel
swindle mentioned above.' 0 4 This dispute precipitated a constitutional crisis resulting in the famous decree of King James I that
permanently secured the primacy of equity when its rules con: 5 Thus, for many years a
flicted with those of the common law.10
deed or contract might either have been void at law for fraud in
the factum, or valid at law but voidable in equity for fraud in the
inducement. The cost and delay of requiring two judicial proceedings to settle one dispute eventually led to the abolition of separate courts of law and equity and creation of the familiar merged
system in which equitable defenses can be raised directly, in the
against an action brought on a traditionally legal
same forum,
6
0

ground.1

Since the common-law courts in England used juries and the
Chancellor did not, the difference between legal and equitable
rules became the dividing line affecting the constitutional right to
jury trial in civil cases under the merged system. Throughout the
United States, including New York, constitutional provisions preserved inviolate the right to trial by jury in all cases in "which it
has been heretofore used."'0 7 When the court in Mercantile &
08
applied CPLR 4101 in holding the inducGeneral Reinsurance1
ing misrepresentation to be an equitable defense separate from
the legal validity of the insurance contract, it did so in subserviSee Courtney v. Glanvil, 79 Eng. Rep. 294 (KB. 1615).
The Coke-Ellesmere controversy is treated briefly in WALSH, supra note 59,
and at length in John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred:The Attack on the
Chancery in 1616, 36 ILL. L. REv. 127 (1942).
106 See N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 3. The powers formerly possessed by the
separate courts of law and equity were vested in the reorganized supreme court, id.,
and implemented by § 69 of the Field Code, which abolished the use of rigid forms of
action as well as the distinction between law and equity. Thenceforth there was only
a single form: the civil action. Section 150 of the Code was amended by 1852 N.Y.
Laws ch. 392 to expressly permit equitable defenses and counterclaims in any action,
ratifying the practice already sanctioned in Haire v. Baker, 5 N.Y. 357 (1851), and
Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 (1854) (trial took place before 1852 amendment).
107 N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2. The same guarantee was contained in New
York's first constitution, N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI, and N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art.
VII, and was repeated when the 1846 constitution was superseded in 1894 with N.Y.
CONST. of 1894, art. I, § 2.
108 624 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1993).
104
105
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ence to1 0 the
constitutional guarantee, which it cited in its
9
opinion.

Had our legal and political history been different, and had our
state constitutional guarantee been adopted in 1616, immediately
after the Coke-Ellsemere controversy, the result in the case under
consideration would have been unexceptionable. At that time,
fraud in the inducement of a contract was of exclusively equitable
cognizance, and would have fallen outside our constitutional guarantee of jury trial. It was only possible for a defense of fraud to
come before a jury when fraud in the factum rendered a contract
"void," as in the Thoroughgood case. 110 This is presumably what
the New York Court of Appeals meant when it confined the effect
of the jury's verdict to whether the insurance contract was
"facially valid.""'
Two facts of legal history, however, alter the case. First, the
"heretofore used" clause of the New York State Constitution refers
to neither the use of juries in the seventeenth century nor even as
of 1791, the timeline for applying the Seventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 1 ' Except for the present constitution, adopted in 1938,113 which simply carried forward the jury
trial guarantee as it previously existed, 1 4 the earlier New York
constitutions each updated the timeline for applying the guarantee. Hence, the "heretofore used" test does not refer merely to the
colonial period antedating the first New York Constitution of
1777; it refers at least to the use of juries at the time of the merger
of law and equity in 1846 and, according to the most recent dictum
of the New York Court of Appeals, to their use as of 1894.115 The
109 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v.ColonialAssurance Co., 624 N.E.2d at
629-30 (holding issues pertaining to equitable defense or counterclaim to be determined by court).
110 Thoroughgood v. Cole, 76 Eng. Rep. 408 (C.P. 1582).
111 Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance Co., 624 N.E.2d at
630-31.
112 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); see Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial:A Study in the Irrationalityof RationalDecisionMaking, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 486
(1975). The seventh amendment right to jury trial does not apply to civil cases in state
courts. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
113 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
114 Thus, the 1938 Constitution did not automatically bestow constitutional status upon rights to jury trial that had been created by statute after 1894. See 4 WEINsTEN., ET AL., supra note 31, 4101.07 (1992) (discussing judicial construction of coverage of prior constitutions).
115 See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 427 (1856) ("'[11eretofore'... means
before 1846, and cannot, to limit its meaning, be carried back to 1777, and confined to
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second important fact of legal history is that rules that were originally applied only in equity did not always remain so. Even prior
to the merger, there was a constant process of absorption from equity to law, often accompanied by a withering away of equitable
jurisdiction.1 1 6 One example out of several is the right of a contract assignee. Assignments were not recognized at early common
law, only in equity. 7 Eventually, by use of legal fiction, the assignee was given the right to sue at law' and equity at length
declined to entertain bills brought by assignees because the remedy at law had become adequate.11 9 This process was complete in
New York before 1846, with assignees suing at law and receiving
cases which, at that earlier period, were triable by jury."); Conderman v. Conderman,
44 Hun 181, 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1887) ("The right of trial by jury... was an existing
right at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1846 .... ."). The historical
reference embedded in the several constitutions only embraces the previous use of
juries as of right, not their occasional advisory use in equity actions. See Sheppard v.
Steele, 43 N.Y. 52, 57 (1870); In re Gurland, 146 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833-34 (App. Div.
1955). Where, however, a statute's enactment created a new right to jury trial, utilization of the "heretofore used" clause in a subsequently adopted constitution operated to
upgrade the existing statutory right into a new constitutionally vested right. See Moot
v. Moot, 108 N.E. 424, 425 (N.Y. 1915) ("The measure of the right of trial by jury
preserved by the State Constitution (article 1, § 2)... is the right to a jury trial in
such cases as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1846."). But
see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 550 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1990) (implying that
"heretofore used" clause refers to use of juries as of 1894). The court apparently
adopted the analysis of Surrogate Sobel in In re Luria's Estate, 313 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sur.
Ct. 1970):
[The] modified heretofore clause-"Trial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteedby constitutionalprovision shall remain inviolate
forever-". The net effect of this modified provision was to continue under
the constitutional guarantee all common law rights to jury trial prior to 1777
and all such statutory rights enacted prior to 1894. Excluded however [sic]
from the guarantee were all new statutory rights to jury trial enacted between the years 1894 to 1938.
Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
116 See Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequaciesof Equity, 12 TEx. L.
REv. 109 (1934) (discussing ramifications of legal encroachments into field of equity).
117 JAMEs B. AMES, LEcruREs ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEouS LEGAL EsSAYS 210 (1913); W. S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action
by the Common Law, 33 HARv. L. REV. 997, 1016-27 (1920) (discussing assignability
of rights in both common law and equity actions).
118 Winch v. Keeley, 1 T.R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (KB. 1787) (stating that assignee is to sue at law in name of assignor).
119 Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327, 59 Eng. Rep. 383 (V.C. 1838). "The Plaintiff is the assignee of the debt.., therefore his remedy is naturally at law. In order to
give jurisdiction in such a case to a Court of Equity, the Plaintiff must shew that there
is some legal bar existing which prevents his suing at law." Hammond, 59 Eng. Rep.
at 385; see Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U.S. 672 (1882) (discussing when claimant may
proceed in equity upon ground of assignment).
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trial by jury.120 Because of this development, no one has ever
challenged the right of a contract assignee to a jury trial under the
"heretofore used" guarantee of the 1846 Constitution, and all succeeding constitutions.' 2 ' Similarly, estoppel in pals, originally the
creation of equity, became absorbed into the common law at an
122
early date.
Bearing in mind that our current body of law under the
merged system consists of doctrines that migrated from equity to
law at various times, a particular issue cannot be excluded from
the constitutional right to jury trial merely by proving that it had
its origin in equity. An issue lies outside the guarantee only if it
remained exclusively equitable when the constitutional guarantee
was adopted.' 2 3 As a leading text notes: "Many matters such as
duress, fraud and illegality, which had once been cognizable only
in equity, were familiar defenses to a legal action by the end of the
eighteenth century."' 24 When this historical test is applied to the
distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the induce120 See, e.g., Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (claimant suing at
law over conflict of equitable claims); Taylor v. Bates, 5 Cow. 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826)
(assignee suing at law); Briggs v. Doff, 19 Johns. 95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (plaintiff in
common law court suing for interest in assignment); Carter v. United Ins. Co., 1
Johns. Ch. 463 (N.Y. Ch. 1815) (dismissing plaintiff assignees' suit in equity to recover proceeds of insurance policy on grounds that plaintiff assignees have adequate
remedy at law).
121 See WALSH, supra note 59, at 93 n.28. While insisting that the rights of an
assignee remain "equitable" for substantive law purposes, Walsh notes that since "issues of fact in these cases were, of course, tried by jury at law long before the era of
our constitutions, the right to jury trial in such cases, no doubt, would be enforced."
Id.
122 For a discussion of how estoppel in pais was transformed from an exclusively
equitable doctrine into one concurrently legal and equitable, see Dickinson v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 147 F.2d 396, 397 (9th Cir. 1945) ("The issue of
estoppel in pais... while equitable in origin, has long been one cognizable as of course
in the courts of common law."); Platte Valley Cattle Co. v. Bosserman-Gates Live
Stock & Loan Co., 202 F. 692, 697 (8th Cir. 1912) ("Estoppel in pais is a creature of
equity. But... it is equally available in actions at law even in the federal courts.");
Carrolton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co., 115 F. 77, 81 (2d Cir.
19w,) v.L luding that "the court should have submitted to the jury the facts on which
the estoppel is predicated"); Martell v. North River Ins. Co., 484 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366
(1985) ("Estoppel in pais is not inconsistent with and may be asserted in an action at
law.") (citations omitted).

123 CLARY,

supra note 25, at 91-95; FLEAMNG

JsAMS, JR. mr AL., CxvL PROCEDURE

§§ 8.2, 8.9 (4th ed. 1992); E. W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses UnderModern Codes, 18
MICH. L. REv. 717, 723 (1920) ("Even under the Common Law Procedure Act, it does
not appear that the law courts ever assumed to take over the whole field of equity
jurisdiction.").
124 JAmEs ET AL.,

supra note 123, § 8.2, at 415 (footnote omitted).
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ment, the answer is that the latter was received into the commonlaw system before the merger in 1846.
1. Fraud
Although at early common law contracts under seal could not
be impeached because of fraud in the inducement, 125 such fraud
was recognized as a defense to simple contracts by the eighteenth
century. 126 Indeed, fraud in the inducement was recognized as a
freestanding tort in 1789;127 this subsequently made it impossible
to argue that it was not a defense at law to an executory contract. 12 Merchants fraudulently induced to sell goods on credit
were allowed to rescind at law and recover the goods from a fraudulent buyer or the buyer's transferee, except where the transferee
was a good-faith purchaser for value.' 29 Early New York commonlaw cases followed the English rule and did not recognize fraud in
125 Ames, supra note 103, at 51 ("Startling as the proposition may appear, it is
nevertheless true that fraud was no defence to an action at law upon a sealed contract."). Prior to the Law and Equity Act of 1915, which allowed equitable defenses to
be pleaded in actions brought on the law side of the federal courts, fraud in the inducement of a sealed contract was generally not allowed as a defense at law despite
the progressive efforts of (then) Circuit Judge William Howard Taft in Wagner v. National Life Ins. Co., 90 F. 395 (6th Cir. 1898). See Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., Fraudas a
Defence atLaw in the FederalCourts, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1915) (discussing availability of fraud as legal defense in federal courts). Federal courts within the same
circuit often disallowed the defense against a contract under seal, yet permitted it to
be raised against simple contracts. Compare Whitcomb v. Shultz, 223 F. 268 (2d Cir.
1915) (disallowing defense of fraud in the inducement where contract under seal sued
upon in federal court at law) with Such v. Bank of State of New York, 127 F. 450
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (allowing contract not under seal to be avoided at law in federal
court for settlement induced by fraud).
126 Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T.R. 12, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (KB. 1785) (recognizing
fraudulent inducement by plaintiff's agent as valid defense in avoidance of insurance
contract); Seaman v. Fonereau, 2 Strange 1183, 93 Eng. Rep. 1115 (KB. 1743) (voiding contract induced by fraud).
127 See Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (MB. 1789).
128 See 5 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 103, § 1487, at 4153. "It is undoubtedly true that wherever the circumstances are such as to warrant an action for deceit
for inducing a person to enter into a contract, they will certainly warrant avoidance or
rescission of the bargain." Id.; see also Smith v. Ryan, 84 N.E. 402, 403 (N.Y. 1908)
("Where ... the fraud is of such a nature as would sustain a common-law action of
deceit, it may safely be said that the contract may be avoided either at law or in
equity, at the election of the defrauded party .... ").
129 See, e.g., Pierce v. Drake, 15 Johns. 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Beecker v. Vrooman, 13 Johns. 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Willson v. Foree, 6 Johns. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1810). The significance of rescission at law in these cases lies of course in the rule
that if the credit sale was not avoided, the seller could not sue in replevin or general
assumpsit and would be bound by the credit terms of the special contract. See, e.g.,
Whitbeck v. Van Ness, 11 Johns. 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814) (holding seller bound by
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the inducement as a defense to sealed contracts until 1829,130
when a statute enacted in that year was interpreted as changing
the rule. 13 ' Thereafter, fraud in the inducement was a defense at
law to all contracts, sealed or otherwise. The acceptance of fraud
in the inducement as a defense at common law was recognized by
the New York Chancery Court prior to the merger. In 1843, Chancellor Walworth affirmed the Vice-Chancellor's refusal to enjoin a
pending common-law action on nonnegotiable notes allegedly induced by fraud. 1 3 2 The Chancellor observed that:

If the complainant has any defence to these notes, therefore, it is
one which is equally available in the suit at law as in this court
....

[T]he vice chancellor very properly dissolved the injunction,

credit terms where seller accepted note of third person as payment without buyer's
indorsement).
The equitable origin of the seller's right to rescind for fraud in the inducement is
evidenced in the protection given to a bona fide purchaser for value against the fraudulent buyer. Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Caines 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (protecting
bona fide purchaser from defrauded seller); Parker v. Patrick, 5 T.R. 175, 101 Eng.
Rep. 99 (K-B. 1793) (same); Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cow. 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) (same);
cf. Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 267 (N.Y. 1838) (leaving bonafide purchaser unprotected from mere bailee where bailee lacked even voidable title). See generally WIILiAm F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AA.RcANILAw 329 (2d ed.
1932).
130 See, e.g., Jackson v. Hills, 8 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) (holding lease
under seal cannot be assailed at law on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation as to its
consideration or inducement); Dale v. Roosevelt, 9 Cow. 307 (N.Y. 1827) (holding
fraudulent inducement is no defense to action at law on sealed instrument); Dorr v.
Munsell, 13 Johns. 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Vrooman v. Phelps, 2 Johns. 177 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1807); cf Van Valkenburghv. Rouk, 12 Johns. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (holding that fraud in factum is good defense at law).
131 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 406, § 77 (1829); see 1936 N.Y. LAW REv. CoAM'N REP. 29697); see also Johnson v. Miln, 14 Wend. 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935); Whitney v. Allaire, 4
Denio 554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (holding defrauded party may defend action upon
sealed or unsealed instrument based on fraud in inducement), aff'd, 1 N.Y. 305
(1848); Van Epps v. Harrison, 5 Hill 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (allowing defrauded party
to defend action upon sealed or unsealed instrument when fraudulently induced into
contract); Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833); Stuart v. Lester, 49
Hun 58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gem Term 1888); Wilson v. Baptist Educ. Soc., 10 Barb. 308
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833). Many early cases are reviewed in Day v. New England CarSpring Co., 7 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1854) (No. 3688).
In a case that arose just prior to the statutory change, the disfavor in which the
old rule had fallen is evidenced in the court's opinion in Stevens v. Squire, 4 Wend.
469 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830). In referring to the rule that sealed contracts could not be
attacked at law for fraud in the inducement, the court said that "[tihe remedy is with
the legislature. I confess I can see no very good reason why this defence should be
excluded from a court of law, and the party sent into a court of equity; but so the point
has always been decided." Id. at 473.
132 Crane v. Bunnell, 10 Paige Ch. 333 (N.Y. Ch. 1843).
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and left him3to
defend himself as he could before the court of law
1 3
and a jury.
It is true that New York cases have occasionally referred to
fraud in the inducement as an "equitable" defense.1 3 1 Without
doubt, this usage reflects the historical origin of the defense, without reference to its reception into the common law prior to the
Constitution of 1846. This simplified usage was harmless enough
in the years prior to 1963 when the CPLR was enacted. In those
early years, nothing of consequence turned on the distinction between defenses that originated in equity and were never recognized at common law, and those that had worked over into the
common-law system prior to the adoption of the "heretofore used"
guarantee in the Constitution of 1846. Prior to the CPLR, all
these defenses were triable in the same manner as the action itself.13 5 In requiring "equitable defenses" to be tried by the court,
not the jury, the CPLR must be interpreted in a manner conforming to the constitutional guarantee. This means that we
must discriminate between the two kinds of equitable defenses described above. In light of legal history, no one can legitimately
argue today that fraud in the inducement is an equitable defense
in the sense constitutionally permitted to be covered by CPLR
4101.136 To do so would deprive the nonconsenting party of a right
13 7
to jury trial "heretofore used."
133
134

Id. at 341.

See, e.g., Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Anderson, 146 N.E. 381 (N.Y. 1925); Sparer
v. Travellers Ins. Co., 173 N.Y.S. 673, 676 (App. Div. 1919); Wilbisky v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 152 N.Y.S. 1048 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1915).
135 See supra note 27.
136 This statement assumes that CPLR 4101 is constitutional with respect to defenses that remained equitable at the time the Constitution of 1846 was adopted and
that were accorded jury trial solely by virtue of statute prior to the Constitution of
1894. Although conventional wisdom has it that the "heretofore used" clause in the
1894 Constitution operated to upgrade previously enacted statutory jury trial rights
to constitutionally protected status, no actual case necessarily so holds and several
older cases hold the contrary. See supra notes 31, 72 and accompanying text. Because
the currently accepted view has such potentially drastic consequences with respect to
the constitutionality of CPLR 4101, this writer prefers to leave the effect of the 1894
Constitution an open question and base the conclusions in this article on the well
established effect of the Constitution of 1846.
137 In demonstrating that fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement were
both cognizable at law before the Constitution of 1846 and were consequently within
the jury trial guarantee, it is not this author's intent to equate them for all purposes.
When an equitable doctrine such as fraud in the inducement works its way into the
common law, it does not shed its substantive equitable characteristics. For example,
an apparent document, such as a release, that is shown to be void because of fraud in
the factum, confers no rights on any person, even an innocent party who paid value
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Innocent Misrepresentation in General

The situation with respect to nonfraudulent material misrepresentation is not so clear. Since fraud as a tort required proof of
scienter, the linkage of tort law to contract law generally prevented courts from recognizing innocent misrepresentation as a
legal defense to contract claims prior to the merger in 1846.138
The only relief available to one whose consent to a disadvantageous contract had been induced by the promisee's innocent material misrepresentation appears to have been in equity.13 9 Therefore, if we use 1846 as the date for dividing defenses into those
that remained exclusively equitable and those that had become
concurrently legal, innocent misrepresentation in general would
have to be classified as an equitable defense to a contract claim.
One alternative line of reasoning, which has received little attention, would be to recognize an ongoing dynamic relation between law and equity. Just because a particular issue was exclusively equitable before the merger is no reason why it must
remain so forever. In one sense, of course, legal innovations after
the merger cannot strictly be categorized as legal or equitable.
Since the relation between law and equity no longer involves two
therefor. Pimpinello v. Swift, 170 N.E. 530 (N.Y. 1930). On the other hand, a release
tainted by fraud in the inducement practiced by a third person not in privity with the
releasee is enforceable if the releasee acquired his legal right for value and without
notice of the fraud. Talmadge v. United States Shipping Bd., 66 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.
1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 669 (1934); ef Fairbanks v. Snow, 13 N.E. 596 (Mass.
1887) (holding that whether plaintiff knew defendant entered into contract under duress caused by third party is material fact) (Holmes, J.). The distinction between the
two types of fraud may be relevant for other purposes, such as the requirement that
any consideration be returned as a condition of avoidance. Compare Gilbert v. Rothschild, 19 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1939) with Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 589 F. Supp. 296
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Different burdens of proof are also implicated in the distinction.
Boxberger v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 142 N.E. 357 (N.Y. 1923).
138 See Joslyn v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 177 F. 863 (6th Cir. 1910); Kennedy v. Panama, New Zealand, & Australian Royal Mail Co., 2 L.R.-Q.B. 580 (Q.B. 1867); Behn v.
Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 122 Eng. Rep. 281 (Ex. Ch. 1863); Hopkins v. Tanquery, 15
C.B. 130, 139 Eng. Rep. 369 (C.P. 1854); see also ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES,
REsTrUTION 120 (2d ed. 1978); WILmaa H. PAGE, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 149, 15253 (1905); WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 103, § 1500.
139 Cooper v. Joel, 1 DeG. F. & J. 240 (CL 1859); In re Liverpool Borough Bank,
26 Beav. 268, 53 Eng. Rep. 901 (Ch. 1858); Moens v. Heyworth, 10 M. & W. 147, 152
Eng. Rep. 418, 421 (Ch. 1842); Taylor v. Fleet, 1 Barb. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847), rev'd,
4 Barb. 95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. Term 1848) (holding mistake not sufficiently proved);
see Phillips v. Conklin, 2 Thomp. & C. 619 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. Term), aff'd, 58 N.Y.
682 (1874) (recognizing innocent misrepresentation as defense to legal claim under

merged system and characterized as equitable defense); HENRY H. MOCLINTOCK,
HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF

EQUrY 214-17 (2d ed. 1948).
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distinct institutions, there is no actual place for doctrine to migrate from or to. As the great historian Maitland remarked, "The
day will come when lawyers will cease to inquire whether a given
rule be a rule of equity or a rule of common law: suffice it that it is
a well-established rule administered by the High Court of Justice."140 Accordingly, it might be supposed that the old phenome-

non of doctrine migrating from equity to law might cease after the
merger. Nevertheless, so long as the constitutional right to jury
trial in civil cases is based on historical practice derived from the
dual court systems of law and equity, the old concepts continue to
"rule us from their graves."' 4 ' The post-merger migration of pre-

viously equitable doctrine into conventional legal categories is
seen constantly in the expansion of legal causes of action - particularly quasi-contract - with a concomitant expansion of factual disputes subject to trial by jury. As Judge
Andrews wrote
42
over one hundred years ago in Roberts v. Ely:'
The action for money had and received to the use of another is
the form in which courts of common law enforce the equitable
obligation. The scope of this remedy has been gradually extended to embrace many cases which were originally cognizable
only in courts of equity. Whenever the defendant has in his possession money which he cannot conscientiously retain from another, the latter may recover it in this form of action, subject to
the restriction that the mode of trial and the relief which can be
given in a legal action are adapted to the exigencies of the particular case, and that the transaction is capable of adjustment by
that procedure without prejudice to the interests of third persons. No privity of contract between the parties
is required ex143
cept that which results from circumstances.
With respect to nonfraudulent misrepresentation, the most
important modern case is Seneca Wire & Manufacturing Co. v.
A.B. Leach & Co.14 The defendant sold corporate bonds to the
plaintiff upon the representation that they were listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. When the corporation went into receivership a few months later, the plaintiff discovered that they had not
F.W. MrLAND,

EQUITY AND THE FoRMs OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 20 (1909).
Id. at 296. "The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from
their graves." Id.
142 20 N.E. 606 (N.Y. 1889).
143 Id. at 607-08; accord DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 96 N.E. 722 (N.Y. 1911)
(holding that subrogation right formerly enforceable only in equity is sufficient to sustain action at law).
144 159 N.E. 700 (N.Y. 1928).
140
141
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been listed. It tendered the bonds back to the defendant and sued
for restitution of the price. As a garden variety quasi-contract action, the case was tried before a jury but the court dismissed the
complaint at the close of plaintiff's case because there was no
proof that the defendant knowingly misrepresented the listing of
the bonds. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and granted
a new trial. It held that, while scienter is necessary for a tort
claim for damages, 14 5 an innocent misrepresentation was sufficient for an action in rescission and restitution. The court cited
earlier cases in equity for this proposition, but it held that the rule
was the same in an action at law:
As no equitable relief was required, it was inappropriate, if not
impossible, for the plaintiff to maintain an action for rescission in
equity. All it wanted was the return of its money. Action at law
was, therefore, proper. The proof required was no different from
that which would be required in equity. No reason exists for a
distinction.... It is not necessary in order that a contract may
be rescinded for fraud or misrepresentation that the party making the misrepresentation should have known that it was false.
Innocent misrepresentation is sufficient, and this rule applies to
actions at law based
upon rescission as well as to actions for re46
scission in equity.'

A new trial was ordered because the materiality of the misrepresentation presented a jury question.
The process of absorbing equity into law is gradual and selective, not wholesale or automatic simply according to the nature of
the relief sought. As Judge Andrews observed in the passage previously quoted,' 47 the mode of trial at law must be suited to the
nature of the claim. A vendor's action for specific performance of a
land sale contract does not become an action at law simply because the object is recovery of money.148 The merits potentially
implicate such a mix of flexible principles (e.g., laches, hardship,

145 Id. at 702; see also Reno v. Bull, 12 N.E. 144 (N.Y. 1919); Kountze v. Kennedy,
41 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1895). In New York, innocent misrepresentation is a ground only
for rescission, and not for damages. Radel v. 134 West 25th Bldg. Corp., 226 N.Y.S.
560 (App. Div. 1928). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(C) (1977) with

DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 608-10, 732-34 (1973).
146 Seneca Wire, 159 N.E. at 702 (citations omitted).
147 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
148 Rindge v. Baker, 57 N.Y. 209 (1874) (dictum); Bensinger v. Erhardt, 77 N.Y.S.
577 (App. Div. 1902).
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clean hands)149 that trial by a lay jury would be difficult to administer. Similarly, the holding of the Seneca Wire case, that misrepresentation is recognized at law as a ground for rescission and restitution, does not extend to a like claim based on mistake. Such a
claim involves a balancing of equities best left to the court. 150 At
the root of the Seneca Wire case is the insight that the issue of
material misrepresentation is functionally suitable for jury deteruination. Fraud actions for damages are routinely tried before
juries. Rescission or avoidance for misrepresentation presents an
even more clean-cut issue because there is no need to draw any
inference as to state of mind as there is in fraud cases requiring
proof of scienter.
The same prudence shown by the courts in selectively borrowing from equity to extend the scope of legal actions should be exercised with respect to extending legal defenses by the same process.
At an earlier point, this Article supported the policy of CPLR 4101
over the previous practice of trying all equitable defenses before a
jury and an example was given of reformation of contracts. It was
pointed out that if a plaintiff seeking reformation did not get a
jury trial, it made no sense for a defendant to get one where he
invoked reformation as a defense to an action on the written contract.'5 1 Under CPLR 4101, neither gets a jury trial, and that is
the way it should be. The nature of the evidence and the special
burden of proof for reformation would pose a difficult task for a lay
149 WALSH, supra note 59, at 283, 472-88. Factors as those stated in the text are
ofttimes styled "equitable defenses." They are such in the sense that they influence
the granting or withholding of equitable remedies (i.e., specific performance or injunction). They have no effect on legal rights or remedies. The kind of equitable defense
covered by CPLR 4101 consists of facts that, prior to the merger, would have justified
equitable interference with an action at law. Crary v. Goodman, 12 N.Y. 266 (1853).
The difference between the two classes of equitable defenses is explained by Judge
Cardozo in Golde Clothes Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 141 N.E. 917, 918 (N.Y.
1923) ("The defendant does not make out an equitable defense unless upon the same
facts, in the days when equitable defenses were unknown in actions of ejectment... it
might have maintained a suit in equity to enjoin the prosecution of the remedy at
law.") (citations omitted).
150 See supra note 79. Compare the issue of mistake in the terms of a written
contract. Prior to the merger, such a mistake was not correctable at law. Cheriot v.
Baker, 2 Johns. 346 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807). The remedy was in equity. Gillespie v.
Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585 (N.Y. Ch. 1817); see also Goode v. Riley, 28 N.E. 228 (Mass.
1891) (Holmes, J.) (emphasizing nonjury determination). Compare Dow v. Whetton, 8
Wend. 160 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831) (holding that in courts of law parol evidence is only
proper to show misrepresentation, but in courts of equity it may be used to show mistake) with Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Gurnee, 1 Paige Ch. 278 (N.Y. Ch. 1818).
151 See supra note 33.
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jury that is presumably bound by the parol evidence rule with respect to contract interpretation.
The proper mode of trying a misrepresentation defense involves the other side of the coin. Under Seneca Wire, a plaintiff
seeking restitution of money paid under a contract induced by
misrepresentation gets a jury trial.1 5 2 It is submitted that the
same principle of post-merger development applicable to causes of
action also applies to defenses, and that misrepresentation should
now be acknowledged as a legal defense for the procedural purpose of jury trial. If the jury is competent to try the issue when
the victim of misrepresentation is suing to get his purchase money
back, it makes no sense to say it is not a jury question when a
defendant is resisting the other party's contract claim to recover
the same money from him.
Notwithstanding the argument in favor of recognizing innocent misrepresentation as a legal defense to a contract claim, for
the purpose of jury trial, the question at best must be considered
open; no court could be criticized as demonstrably wrong if it decided that, according to the historical test, innocent misrepresentation in general was an equitable defense under CPLR 4101.
However, the two New York cases criticized in this article are both
insurance cases; and the proper characterization of an insurer's
misrepresentation defense presents a distinct issue to be separately discussed.
3.

Innocent Misrepresentation in Insurance Law

Contract law is not and has never been monolithic. Despite
the great unifying efforts of treatise writers such as Williston and
the first Restatement, different types of transactions generate
their own peculiar satellite rules. Contracts involving labor and
employment, sales of goods, real estate transactions and insurance, among others, each possess unique characteristics at the
margin of the great central core of contract doctrine. However late
we may date the general recognition of innocent misrepresentation as a ground of avoidance "at law," there is abundant evidence
in the common-law reports of its early recognition in the context of
insurance.
A "warranty" in insurance law is a term of the insurance contract by which the insured agrees that, if the fact warranted is
152

See supra text accompanying notes 145 and 146.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:823

untrue, the policy is void. 153 The effect of an insurance warranty
is generally the same as that of an express condition in contract
law. Just as with express conditions, warranties in insurance contracts were strictly enforced. If the fact warranted proved to be
untrue, the insurer was allowed to avoid the duty of payment
without regard to the intent of the insured and, in theory, without
regard to the materiality of the fact warranted, 5 4 although some
attempt was made to soften the rigor of the rule through
interpretation. 1 5 5
Traditionally, a representation, unlike a warranty, is not a
term of the contract, at least not an express term. 56 It induces
the contract, but is not a formal part of it. The importance of representations in insurance law was probably born out of the need
for some residual category in which to place those statements by
the insured that could be found by interpretation to be other than
a warranty. Representations were so closely related to warranties, however, that by Lord Mansfield's time it was settled that no
intentional fraud need be proved by the insurer to defeat the policy claim.'5 7 What had to be proved, and what made representations different from warranties, was the element of materiality did the misrepresentation of fact, without regard to the intent of
the insured, induce the insurer to undertake a risk it would not
otherwise have undertaken?' 5 8
Since a representation was a statement made to induce the
contract, not a term of the contract, early text writers struggled to
reconcile the role of innocent misrepresentation in insurance law
with the then generally accepted notion of scienter as an element
of fraud at law. 15 9 The rationalization that found most favor with
153 Edwin W. Patterson, Warrantiesin Insurance Law, 34 COLuM. L. REv. 595,
601 (1934).
154 See Jeffries v. Economical Mut. Life Ins. Corp., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 47 (1874);
Jennings v. Chenango County Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Denio 75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846).

supra note 77, at 411.
Id. at 412,416; see, e.g., Sager v. Friedman, 1 N.E.2d 971 (N.Y. 1936); Grattan
v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274 (1883); Burritt v. Saratoga County Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 5 Hill 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
155 VANCE,
156

157

See Burritt, 5 Hill at 188; MacDowell v. Fraser, 99 Eng. Rep. 170 (K-B. 1779);

Pawson v. Watson, 2 Cowp. 785, 98 Eng. Rep. 1361 (KB. 1778); Carter v. Boehm, 97
Eng. Rep. 1162 (KB. 1766); see also Carpenter v. American Ins. Co., 5 F. Cas. 105
(C.C.D.R.I. 1839) (No. 2428) (Story, J.).
158 See Donley v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 76 N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1906); American Credit
Indem. Co. v. Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co., 95 F. 111 (2d Cir. 1899); Penn Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 72 F. 413 (6th Cir. 1896) (Taft, J.).
159 See VANCE, supra note 77, at 392-93.
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the courts in England and New York viewed the insurance contract as containing an "implied condition" that "all representations, on the faith of which the contract was entered into, shall be
substantially in accordance with the facts."' 6 °
While the earliest common-law cases establishing the effect of
innocent misrepresentation involved the then important business
of marine insurance, the same rule was applied in New York to all
types of insurance. If there was a genuine issue of fact, either as
to the truth of the representation or as to its materiality, the question was for the jury to decide. This was so in the cases decided in
the common-law court before the merger of law and equity' 6 ' and
continued to be the practice thereafter. 62 Any attempt to oust the
role of the jury by characterizing the defense of material misrepresentation in an insurance case as an "equitable defense" 63 is unhistorical and, consequently, unconstitutional.
The only significant change in the law subsequent to the constitutional guarantee of jury trial in 1894, or, for that matter, in
1846, is one not directly relevant to the jury trial issue. Notwithstanding the requirement of materiality with respect to misrepresentations, the strict rule of compliance with warranties continued as part of the common law of insurance. Life insurance
policies, in particular, routinely incorporated information supplied
about the applicant's medical history as a warranty, thereby eliminating materiality as a consideration when litigating claims. To
put an end to this harsh practice, New York enacted a statute in
1906 providing that, in the absence of fraud, any warranty in a
160

Armour v. Transatlantic Fire Ins. Co., 90 N.Y. 450, 456 (1882); Blackburn v.

Vigors, 17 Q.B.D. 553, 561 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1886).

161 See Burritt v. Saratoga County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 5 Hill 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1843) (holding that materiality of misrepresentation is question for jury); Farmers
Ins. & Loan Co., v. Snyder, 16 Wend. 481,488 (N.Y. 1836); Jefferson Ins. Co. v. H. &
D. Cotheal, 7 Wend. 72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831).
162 See, e.g., Sommer v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 24 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 1939) (holding truthfulness of representation is question for jury); Eastern Dist. Piece Dye
Works, Inc. v. Travellers Ins. Co., 138 N.E. 401 (N.Y. 1923); Armour v. Transatlantic
Fire Ins. Co., 90 N.Y. 450, 456 (1882); Gates v. Madison County Mut. Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.
469 (1851) (holding that materiality of concealment is issue for jury); Louis v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 68 N.Y.S. 683 (App. Div. 1901), aff'd, 65 N.E. 1119 (N.Y.
1902); Hartnett v. Home Life Ins. Co., 239 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1963).
163 Just as with fraud, see supra note 134 and accompanying text, courts have
referred to nonfraudulent misrepresentation as an "equitable" defense. American Sur.
Co. v. Patriotic Assurance Co., 150 N.E. 599, 602 (N.Y. 1926). Such comments should
be taken simply as referring to the historical origin of the rule, not to whether it had
become recognized at common law prior to the 1846 constitutional guarantee. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Howle, 56 N.E. 908 (Ohio 1900).
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policy of life insurance could only operate as a representation. 164
By effectively changing all warranties into representations, this
statute did not change a legal defense into an equitable one,1 65but
merely changed the substance of the insurer's legal defense.
Until the Tober and Mercantile & General Reinsurance cases,
New
York court had ever held that the issue of material misno
representation presented anything other than a jury question
when raised as a defense to an action for insurance proceeds. The
real battleground between insurance companies and claimants
has always been whether the evidence in any particular case
presented a genuine question of fact on which rational people
might differ, or whether the defense (as to which the insurer has
the burden of proof) 1 6 6 was established beyond peradventure, in
which case the court could rule as a matter of law. On this battleground, those who view the jury in a populist sense as the buffer
between the letter of the law and its impact on individuals are
pitted against those of more conservative views who mistrust the
potentially lawless sympathies of lay jurors and look to judges to
keep them in line with the law as written. The latter group has
reason to be satisfied with the New York decisions. 6 There is,
thus, additional irony in a holding that would remove from the
jury the limited number of cases that survive the courts' disposi164 1906 N.Y. Laws ch. 326 (formerly N.Y. Ins. Law § 58, now N.Y. INs. LAw
§ 3204(c)). This provision also applies to accident and health insurance policies and
annuity contracts. Id.
165 Lampke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 18 N.E.2d 14 (N.Y. 1938); Eastern Dist.
Piece Dye Works, Inc. v. Travellers Ins. Co., 138 N.E. 401 (N.Y. 1923); see PAGE, supra
note 138, § 150.
166 Lampke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 18 N.E.2d 14 (N.Y. 1938); Meagher v.
Executive Life Ins. Co., 607 N.Y.S.2d 361 (App. Div. 1994); Ferris v. Columbian Mut.
Ins. Co., 593 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 1993); Winnick v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 494 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Div. 1985); DiPippo v. Prudential Ins. Co., 450 N.Y.S.2d
237 (App. Div. 1982); Rosenthal v. Prudential Ins. Co., 45 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
167 "The New York courts are more inclined than most other American courts to
withdraw questions of fact from the jury, at least with respect to the materiality of
misrepresentations." Edwin W. Patterson, Misrepresentationby Insured Under the
New York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 241, 254 (1944). Recent cases, holding
certain misrepresentations material as a matter of law, confirm Patterson's observation. See, e.g., Leamy v. Berkshire Ins. Co., 347 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y. 1976); Vander Veer
v. Continental Ins. Co., 312 N.E.2d 156 (N.Y. 1974); Myers v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 401 N.Y.S.2d 325 (App. Div. 1978); Process Plants Corp. v. Beneficial Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 385 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 928 (N.Y. 1977). The
New York Appellate Division also has discretion concurrent with the trial court to
grant a new trial when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See Hartnett
v. Home Life Ins. Co., 239 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1963).
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tion to rule the defense established as a matter of law on motion
for summary judgment or directed verdict.
CONCLUSION

If the New York Court of Appeals in the Mercantile & General
Reinsurance case was correct in holding that fraud or misrepresentation in the inducement of a contract is per se an equitable
issue, outside the jury's province, then courts and lawyers have
been wasting their time in many cases by jockeying for position to
have the issue joined either in a contract action by the beneficiary,
with a jury, or a rescission action by the insurer, without a jury.
Where fraud or misrepresentation is one among several issues in the case, courts have always understood that there may
often be a tension between adjudicative efficiency on the one hand
and the right to a jury trial on the other. In enforcing the seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution, the federal courts
have subordinated the possible gain in efficiency to the constitutional right. 68 In ordering a simultaneous trial of the equitable
and legal cross-claims in the instant case, the trial judge was following the progressive trend exhibited in several recent New York
cases.169 Upon review, the New York Appellate Division recognized that the appropriate consequence of the procedure adopted
by the trial judge was that the jury verdict on the misrepresentation defense to determining the insured's contract claim was binding on the judge by "internal" collateral estoppel when he decided
the insurer's rescission claim. By turning the clock back to the distinction between law and equity in the seventeenth century and
confining the jury's role in the insured's contract claim to whether
fraud in the factum made the contract void, the court of appeals
finessed the collateral estoppel rule, but jettisoned an important
purpose of conducting the simultaneous trial of both claims. There
168 Trial by jury of an issue common to conflicting legal and equitable claims is
secure in the federal courts under the Seventh Amendment and cannot be circumvented through the device of ordering the equity claim tried first, or by a judicial
finding contrary to the jury's verdict on a common issue of fact. See Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726
F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984); General Inv. Co. v. Ackerman, 37 F.R.D. 38, 40 (S.D.N.Y.

1964).

169 See International Playtex, Inc. v. CIS Leasing Corp., 495 N.Y.S.2d 864 (App.
Div. 1985); Import Alley of Mid-Island, Inc. v. Mid-Island Shopping Plaza, Inc., 477
N.Y.S.2d 675 (App. Div. 1984); John W. Cowper Co. v. Buffalo Hotel Dev. Venture,
471 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div. 1984).
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is little point in avoiding a "back door divestiture" of the right to
jury trial if at the same time the right is divested through the
front door by holding fraud in the inducement a nonjuy equitable
defense.
Although the Mercantile & General Reinsurancecase involved
two commercial entities, most issues of alleged misrepresentation
in insurance cases arise in disputes between the company and the
beneficiary of a life or disability insurance policy, as in the Tober
case. Everyone familiar with trial practice appreciates the significance of the difference between jury and nonjury trials in such
cases. With this in mind, some readers may applaud the recent
cases on pragmatic grounds. Many today view the civil jury as an
anachronism impeding the efficient dispatch of judicial business.
The framers of our constitution were not of this mind when they
drafted the guarantee. The belief that animated the constitutional rule is vividly caught in the opinion of a great New York
chancellor. In 1815, the Court of Errors reversed a common-law
judgment that trespassed on the jury's prerogative of passing 170
on
the materiality of an insurance applicant's nondisclosure.
Chancellor Kent wrote for a unanimous court:
The case before us is, comparatively, of trifling consequence; but
the distinction [between questions of law and fact] I have suggested goes to the very root and essence of trial by jury; and may,
indeed, become of inestimable value, and, perhaps, of perilous
struggle, when the present generation shall have ceased to exist.
I am disposed to hand to posterity the institution of juries as
perfect, in all respects, as we now enjoy it; for I believe it may, in
times hereafter, be found to be no inconsiderable security against
the systematic
influence and tyranny of party spirit, in inferior
17 1
tribunals.

It is respectfully submitted that the recent New York cases
have overlooked the historic relation between law and equity and
have squandered the constitutional legacy that Chancellor Kent's
generation handed down to posterity. It is to be hoped that the
New York Court of Appeals will revisit the question with a more
careful examination of how fraud and misrepresentation fit into
the jury trial guarantee based on historical usage. Until the New
York rule denying jury trial of these defenses is corrected by judicial reexamination or constitutional revision, insurance claimants
170 New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Walden, 12 Johns. 513 (N.Y. 1815).
171 Id. at 519.
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affected by it would do well to have their cases heard in federal
court on diversity grounds if at all possible. There, under the protection of the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution, their right to jury trial is secure.172

172 See supra note 167; see also Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 896 F.2d
1394, 1401 (2d Cir.), vacated, 498 U.S. 964 (1990); Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 137 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943). Ettleson's holding with
respect to jury trial is unaffected by Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U.S. 271 (1988), which overruled Ettleson's holding with respect to the direct appealability of orders granting equitable stays.

